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Biases like overconfidence and anchoring affect values elicited from people in 
predictable ways – due to people’s inherent cognitive processes. The More-Or-Less 
Elicitation (MOLE) process takes insights from how biases affect people’s decisions to 
design an elicitation process to mitigate or eliminate bias. MOLE relies on four, key insights: 
1) uncertainty regarding the location of estimates means people can be unwilling to exclude 
values they would not specifically include; 2) repeated estimates can be averaged to produce 
a better, final estimate; 3) people are better at relative than absolute judgements; and, 4) 
consideration of multiple values prevents anchoring on a particular number. MOLE achieves 
these by having people repeatedly choose between options presented to them by the 
computerised tool rather than making estimates directly, and constructing a range logically 
consistent with (i.e., not ruled out by) the person’s choices in the background. Herein, MOLE 
is compared, across four experiments, with eight elicitation processes – all requiring direct 
estimation of values – and is shown to greatly reduce overconfidence in estimated ranges and 
to generate best guesses that are more accurate than directly estimated equivalents. This is 
demonstrated across three domains – in perceptual and epistemic uncertainty and in a 
forecasting task. 
 








Elicitation describes the conversion of experts’ subjective beliefs into probabilities to 
be used in modelling and forecasting; in effect, extracting other people’s knowledge to reduce 
our own uncertainty regarding a future event or unknown state of the world (Wolfson, 2001). 
As such, it is essential for industries dealing with high uncertainty such as pharmaceuticals 
and petroleum exploration and development – the latter of which has been described as a 
classic example of decision making under uncertainty given high up-front investments and 
low probabilities of economic success for new projects (Newendorp & Schuyler, 2000). 
  
1.1 Problems for Elicitation 
Unfortunately, decades of psychological research, including seminal work by Tversky 
and Kahneman (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1981) have shown the values we elicit 
from experts can be biased as a result of the ways in which people typically think – that is, 
our cognitive limitations and processes. 
Key amongst these are: overconfidence in range estimation (hereafter 
‘overconfidence’); and bias arising from the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic 
(‘anchoring’). The first describes the tendency for ranges that a person believes (to a stated 
level of probability) will contain  a future or unknown value to be too narrow – with the result 
that these ranges contain the true value less often than the person’s stated confidence would 
suggest (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). The second describes people’s tendency 
to base estimates on any number currently at hand, regardless of its relevance – including 
random numbers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). While these are far from the only biases, 
they are central to the field and feature on many lists of important biases affecting human 
decision making (see, e.g., Piatelli-Palmarini, 1994; Russo & Schoemaker, 2002; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). Both also have clear implications for values elicited from experts.  
 
1.2 Psychological Basis of Bias 
To understand how to design elicitation processes that avoid or limit the impact of 
biases, it is necessary to understand how the biases arise – that is, which cognitive limitations 
or tendencies are implicated in their appearance.  
 
1.2.1 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence, as discussed herein, is Moore and Healy’s (2008) ‘overprecision’ – 
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the tendency for elicited ranges to contain predicted values less often than people expect 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982). For example, when people are asked to provide ranges that have 
an 80% chance of capturing the true value, typically these ranges capture the true value less 
than 50% of the time.  This has been observed: in both expert and novice samples across 
various fields (see, e.g., Morgan & Henrion, 1990; Welsh & Begg, 2016); and in observations 
of actual oil industry predictions (Hawkins, Coopersmith, & Cunningham, 2002).   That is, 
people’s confidence judgements tend to be miscalibrated because their ranges are too narrow. 
This has important implications for decision making as uncertainty in outcomes 
determines whether additional funds should be spent on uncertainty reduction or risk 
mitigation/upside capture strategies. As such, this bias can have multi-million dollar impacts 
on investment decisions (see, e.g., Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2007). 
While some authors have argued that overconfidence results from the differences 
between people’s inherent, frequentist understanding  of probability and the need, in 
elicitation tasks, to state subjective probabilities for unique, non-repeatable events 
(Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage &Kleinbolting, 1991) this Brunswikian approach 
suggests that overconfidence is entirely artefactual and will disappear in evaluation tasks that 
allow a person to construct a reference class by asking a different question – “how often have 
ranges that I set actually contained the true value?” - that can be answered using natural, 
frequentist reasoning. In fact, while there is evidence that people are better at evaluating than 
generating ranges (Winman, Hansson, & Juslin, 2004), range evaluation still results in some 
overconfidence (Winman et al, 2004) and recent work by Ferretti, Guney, Montibeller and 
von Winterfeldt (2016), found limited benefit in an experiment where participants both 
generated and then evaluated a range. 
Given this, overconfidence can not be dismissed. Instead, other causes and debiasing 
strategies need to be considered. Research on this, however, has shown that overconfidence is 
resistant to simple debiasing attempts – such as exhortations to increase the widths of ranges 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982) or awareness of the bias’ effects (Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2006) 
and indicates that people are resistant to providing ranges as wide as would be necessary to 
capture their true uncertainty because such ranges are deemed uninformative (Yaniv & 
Foster, 1997).  
This reflects a possible cause of overconfidence – the informativeness-accuracy trade-
off (IAT; Yaniv & Foster, 1995) - whereby people are argued to deliberately provide narrow 
ranges because their preference is to be informative over accurate (well-calibrated). This 
TITLE: More-Or-Less Elicitation 
5 
 
explanation bears some resemblance to one raised in section 1.2.2, below, regarding the mode 
of operation of the anchoring bias wherein people stop adjusting their estimate once they 
reach their region of uncertainty. That is, continuing to adjust one’s estimate of a range’s 
endpoint further into the region of uncertainty decreases the informativeness of the range and 
does not increase the likelihood of the end-point itself being true. 
This possible connection between anchoring and overconfidence echoes the original 
hypothesis that anchoring caused overconfidence through people anchoring on their best 
estimate and failing to adjust far enough away from it (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This 
does seem to occur in some cases (Heywood-Smith, Welsh, & Begg, 2008; Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992) but not in others (Block & Harper, 1991; Bruza, Welsh, Navarro, & 
Begg, 2011; Welsh, Begg, Bratvold, & Lee, 2004), suggesting the relationship is complex but 
that approaches designed to avoid bias in this way could sometimes be beneficial. 
A demonstrated way to alter overconfidence is by changing elicitation format. For 
instance, there is evidence that splitting the task into parts – asking for the 10th and 90th 
percentiles separately rather than for a range that a person is 80% confident will contain the 
true value – produces better results, possibly as a result of lifting limitations on cognitive 
effort (by splitting a single task into two tasks) (see, e.g., Juslin, Wennerholm, & Olsson, 
1999). Other debiasing techniques, proposed in Montbellier and von Winterfeldt’s (2015) and 
tested in Ferretti et al. (2016) include the use of bets to identify errors in probability and the 
presentation of counterfactuals (values lying outside the initial range). Both were found to 
have only small effects on the width of elicited ranges although the use of bets improved the 
best estimate. That is, despite debiasing techniques that offer some benefit, overconfidence 
remains a significant problem for elicited values. 
 
1.2.2 Anchoring 
The original description of anchoring-and-adjustment argues it results because people 
use the anchor as a starting point for their estimation process and then adjust away from the 
anchor until they reach a point at which they feel no need to adjust further (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). This, it is argued, leads to bias because the point at which a person will 
stop adjusting is the point nearest to the anchoring value out of their range of feasible values.  
This explanation is supported by research but so is a second explanation based around 
the idea of priming (for a recent discussion of the two explanations, see Furnham & Boo, 
2011). This holds that the anchoring value sets the region of possible values a person will 
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start evaluating. For example, if asked whether Mt Everest is higher than 5000 metres, a 
person might start by considering whether 5000 metres is a reasonable estimate and, only if 
they decide it is not, will they start to draw possible cues (e.g., the heights of other mountains 
starting with those nearest to 5000m) from their memory for consideration. 
Regardless of the cause, anchoring poses a problem for elicitation in that: any prior 
number can affect a person’s estimate (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); the effect is robust 
(Mussweiler, 2002; Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000); it affects novices and experts  
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987); and is not reduced by people’s awareness of the effect (Welsh et 
al., 2006). This implies that any elicited value could be affected by previously seen or 
experienced values – no matter how irrelevant these might be. 
 
1.3 Building Better Elicitation 
The central reason for understanding the mode of action of biases is, of course, to 
assist in avoiding those biases. That is, understanding what gives rise to a particular bias 
allows us to avoid the bias by avoiding those circumstances. The following sections describe 
how biases and other quirks of human cognition can be used to improve elicitation. 
 
1.3.1 Retaining Uncertainty 
The observation (from Kahneman, 2011) noted in section 1.2.2, that one cause of 
anchoring bias is that people stop adjusting once they have reached a possible estimate that 
lies within their region of uncertainty, has important implications for how a range should be 
elicited from an individual. Specifically, it implies that if a person is allowed to construct a 
range by starting at their best estimate and working out towards the ends from there, they will 
tend to stop at the inner edge of their regions of uncertainty for both the high and low points 
and, as a result, produce a range that is narrower than they otherwise might – as suggested in 
the description of overconfidence in section 1.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 1.  
Given this, the obvious solution is to have people construct their ranges in the 
converse fashion – starting with a very (i.e., much too) wide range and asking them to adjust 
the endpoints inwards, removing regions they are certain the true value will not fall within. In 
this way, a person’s uncertainty could be used to preserve the range as they would, 
presumably, stop cutting away portions of the overall range as soon as they reach the outside 
edge of their region of uncertainty.  
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1.3.2 Relative Judgements 
A robust finding from psycho-physics is that people perform better when asked to 
make relative rather than absolute judgements. For example, Stroop (1932) showed people 
could very accurately sort weights into order but were poor at estimating absolute weights. S 
imilar effects have been shown in many perceptual tasks (see, e.g., Miller, 1956). 
Unfortunately, of course, most elicitation are undertaken in order to obtain absolute 
values to use as forecasts or estimates of unknown parameters. There is, however, evidence 
that people use relative judgements to construct their absolute estimates (Stewart, Brown, & 
Chater, 2005) – a finding that echoes the observations about the priming explanation for 
anchoring in section 1.2.2 where people are argued to draw possible values from memory for 
comparison with the anchor. The difference in accuracy between relative and absolute 
judgements therefore suggests that additional bias results from this translation process. 
In light of this, it seems valuable to consider elicitation processes that allow people to 
make relative judgements rather than absolute ones – as such judgements are more likely to 
be correct and can then be translated into absolute judgements by an algorithm that produces 
less bias than human cognition, increasing the accuracy of the person’s estimate. 
 
1.3.3 Repeated Judgements 
Another robust finding is the so-called ‘wisdom of crowds’ (Galton, 1907; 
Surowiecki, 2004) - the tendency for aggregated estimates from a group of people to be 
superior to the estimates of individuals within that group. This is, primarily, a mathematical 
effect – an observation that any non-systematic biases will differ in direction and magnitude 
between individuals and thus tend to average out. The psychology, of course, comes in when 
considering the extent to which people’s biases are, in fact, non-systematic. For example, 
using the wisdom of crowds approach on a group who had all seen the same anchoring value 
would result in an average estimate biased towards that anchor. Given this, diversity of 
opinion and background and independence of information is the ideal situation for wisdom of 
crowds effects and the larger the group, the better the results tend to be. 
For elicitation tasks, however, the pool of people able to meaningfully interpret a 
question is limited by expertise and confidentiality, with the result that wisdom of crowds is 
of limited use. There is, however, still a benefit to be gained from repeated judgements – 
even from a single individual. 
Research (see, e.g., Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & Pashler, 2008) has shown that 
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asking an individual the same question repeatedly and averaging their responses produces a 
better estimate than simply taking their first estimate. The reasoning is that, where individuals 
do not remember the exact answer they gave previously, they will construct a new estimate 
each time they are asked. Given the limitations of human memory and biases resulting from 
specific elicitation circumstances, however, the set of information a person draws on will 
tend to differ on each occasion (see, e.g., Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007) – meaning 
estimates will not be identical. To the extent that errors and biases differ non-systematically 
they will tend to cancel out (Surowiecki, 2004) and average estimates will be superior to 
individual ones. Of course, the research noted above demonstrated that longer periods of time 
between elicitations increased the independence of estimates and, thus, the benefit gained 
from this – a concern given that values being elicited from experts are often time sensitive. 
In practical terms, then, the ideal elicitation process is one allowing a person’s 
knowledge to be probed in such a way as to allow them to make estimates one after the other 
– with no time delay – while preventing them repeating back previous estimates. The final, 
combined estimate from such a process should be superior to that from any single-estimate 
process.  
 
1.3.4 Avoiding Anchors 
Anchoring bias has proven resistant to debiasing methods based on awareness of the 
effect (Welsh et al., 2006) – although some success has been observed with more directed 
debiasing attempts that lead people to consider values other than the initial anchor 
(Mussweiler et al., 2000). This, of course, requires that a person recognise (have pointed out 
to them) the anchoring value – which poses no problem in experimental tasks but is more 
difficult in real-world circumstances, where an anchor could be a random number the elicitee 
has just encountered or a subconscious intuition based on previous situations. While this may 
seem to be an unfair discounting of expertise (i.e., the expert’s intuition), it should be noted 
that the oil industry (and other areas where elicitation of uncertainty is most commonly used) 
fail to meet the criteria established by Kahneman and Klein (2009) for when expert intuition 
can be relied upon to be accurate. That is, the environment does not have the regularity of 
decisions and feedback required for expert intuition to reliably develop.  
Thus, to avoid anchoring, the best path seems to be extending Mussweiler et al.’s 
(2000) approach and using other values to, in effect, ‘wash out’ the impact of any, one, 
anchoring value. That is, the elicitation process needs to require that the elicitee explicitly 
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consider a number of values across the range of possibility – a strategy already incorporated 
into advice for avoiding bias by proponents of debiasing (Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 
2011; Russo & Schoemaker, 2002). While any one value might, on its own, act as an anchor, 
the need to consider all of them is argued to prevent biased sampling from a particular portion 
of the range of possibility – as suggested by the priming explanation of anchoring – and also 
the process of simple adjustment from an anchor towards a person’s region of uncertainty. 
 
1.4 The MOLE: More-Or-Less Elicitation 
The MOLE process, used in all of the experiments described hereafter, uses the four 
insights above to create a computerised tool that guides a person through an elicitation 
process designed to limit the impact of overconfidence and anchoring while, simultaneously, 
attempting to increase estimates accuracy.  
The first step of the MOLE is the selection of its starting range – ideally by someone 
other than the user. As the MOLE relies on cutting away areas of the range not considered 
feasible, starting with a very wide range (wide enough to contain any reasonable estimate) is 
advised. Where natural limits exist (e.g., percentages or proportions), these are appropriate 
starting ranges. Otherwise, databases of prior outcomes can be used to inform the starting 
range – which should include all values previously seen plus a margin of error at either end to 
account for previously unseen low or high values. 
Starting with this initial (wide) range, MOLE randomly draws pairs of values. These 
values are presented to the participant, who is asked which value they believe is closer to the 
true value (of whatever parameter is being elicited). Once a participant has selected one of the 
options, they are asked to indicate their confidence in this judgement on a 50% (guessing) to 
100% (certain) scale using a slider. 
The MOLE then uses the selection and confidence judgment to update the range from 
which future values will be drawn using a simple, logical rule – that is, if a person is 100% 
confident that their selected option is closer to the true value than the alternative is, then 
values closer to that alternative have, logically, been ruled such out. For example, if a person 
were shown the values 100 and 200 and selected 100 with 100% confidence, then the MOLE 
would no longer include any values above 150 (the midpoint of the two options) when 
drawing future options as the participant has ‘stated’ that the true value is definitely closer to 
100 than 200. 
The MOLE then draws two new values from the (possibly truncated) range and 
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repeats the process for a set number of iterations (10 in the cases described herein). In this 
way, the wide starting range is cut down to a narrower range containing only values that a 
participant has not, specifically, ruled out. 
At the end of its 10 iterations, the MOLE uses the non-100% confidence ratings to 
generate a person’s best guess, using the following assumption: a person’s best guess from 
any single judgement lies between the two options presented to them. Specifically, that it lies 
confidence/100% of the way from the unselected option to the selected option. For example, 
having been shown the values of 100 and 200, a participant selects 200 with 70% confidence 
– that is, they are 70% sure that the true value lies closer to 200 than to 100. We 
operationalize this as indicating that their best guess lies 70% of the way from 100 to 200 – 
that is, at 170. Had they selected 100 with the same confidence, their best guess would be 130 
(70% of the way from 200 to 100). 
One such best guess is generated for each non-100% confidence judgement, excepting 
where the options being compared lie outside the final, feasible range described above – 
reflecting early trials where the participant had not yet cut away those portions of the starting 
range. In this case, the judgement is discarded as misleading. The remaining best guesses are 
then averaged to produce the participant’s overall best guess. 
The MOLE process thus enables us to use all four of the techniques described in 
section 1.3 for building a better elicitation tool. It is designed to limit bias by: 1) reducing 
overconfidence by requiring the participant to rule out rather than rule in regions of 
possibility; 2) collecting repeated measurements of a person’s best estimate in such a way as 
to prevent a person from simply repeating their preferred answer; increasing accuracy by 3) 
allowing people to make relative rather than absolute judgements (i.e, not requiring them to 
directly make an estimate of the parameter being elicited); and 4) avoiding the impact of any 
single anchor or priming effect by requiring the participant consider 10 pairs of values 
selected from across a wider range of possible values than a person might otherwise generate.  
 
1.5 Aims and Structure of this Paper 
This paper presents a series of four experiments comparing the MOLE to various 
elicitation methods under a variety of conditions to determine what benefit it may provide. As 
such, our overall objective is to compare the accuracy and calibration achieved by the MOLE 
with similar measures obtained using alternative elicitation processes and determine whether 
it works in a variety of distinct, elicitation tasks.  
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Given the MOLE’s design, underpinned by psychological theory, we predict it will 
produce better range estimates – in terms of calibration and the accuracy of best estimates 
from those ranges – than elicitation processes wherein people directly estimate values. That 
is, the primary focus of the experiments is on assessing the impact of the MOLE on reducing 
overconfidence – which is a function of range width and the accuracy of their placement. 
Experiment 1a compares MOLE to three elicitation methods requiring participants to 
directly estimate the number of circles on a visual display (perceptual uncertainty). The direct 
elicitation methods include: ‘Simple’ estimation of high and low values to produce a range; 
‘Triangular’ estimation of high and low values and a best guess; and ‘Iterative’, where a 
participant’s initial, high-low, interval estimate is challenged with a value lying outside the 
range and the participant is then asked if they want to revise their range. This study also 
includes the paper’s only direct analysis of the effect of anchoring within the MOLE task – 
examining whether the MOLE’s initial options affect the final, best estimate. 
Experiment 2a uses the same, visual estimation task and compares the MOLE with 
two alternative elicitation methods reliant on repeated measurement of the same individual’s 
opinions – in an effort to determine whether the MOLE’s performance results from repeated 
measurement or longer exposure to stimuli. These are: ‘Repeated’, where the participant is 
asked to repeatedly estimate the minimum and maximum number of circles ten times while 
looking at the same stimulus – in order to test whether simple length of exposure leads to 
better estimation; and ‘Interleaved’, where the same stimulus is presented ten times to 
participants for estimation but these trials are interleaved between 30 distractor trials – 
increasing independence between the elicited ranges. 
Experiment 2 tests the effect of varying the MOLE’s starting range on its performance 
relative to two other elicitation methods: ‘MMM’, or minimum, maximum and most likely; 
and ‘Dialectical’, which asks participants to give their range and then to consider that the true 
value lies outside that range and decide whether it is more likely to lie above or below their 
range before revising their minimum and maximum estimates. In all cases, the stimuli in this 
experiment were numerical questions of fact (i.e., epistemic uncertainty regarding, e.g.,  
geography). Five questions have percentage answers and thus naturally bounded sets of 
options (0 to 100%) while two other sets of 5 questions are naturally unbounded. For these, 
the MOLE’s starting range is set to either 0-200% or 0-500% (of the true value) to test how 
the starting range affects the MOLE’s performance relative to the direct elicitation methods. 
Experiment 3 extends comparisons between the MOLE and direct elicitation methods 
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to a more realistic task wherein future values of stocks, commodities and meteorological 
events were forecast 7 and 28 days into the future. The elicitation method used for 
comparison with the MOLE here is a direct estimation of minimum and maximum values. 
Following the experiments, a general discussion overviews the findings, discusses the 
practical use of the MOLE, caveats and future research, before drawing overall conclusions. 
 
2. Experiment 1a: Overconfidence in Perceptual Uncertainty 1 
2.1 Aims and Objectives 
The first experiment was designed to compare estimates elicited using the MOLE 
method with those achieved using direct range estimation methods – in terms of both the 
accuracy of best guesses and calibration of responses. 
Three elicitation methods were chosen for comparison with the MOLE: a simple 
range estimation task, where participants gave minimum and maximum estimates; a 
‘triangular’ estimation task, which required participants provide a best guess prior to 
estimating the range; and a two-stage ‘iterative’ elicitation task, to assess the impact of 
calling participants’ attention to regions outside their initially estimated range. Both variants 
of the simple range elicitation method were selected in light of the evidence presented in 
section 1.2.2 that these might impact on the level of overconfidence observed. 
The uncertain parameter being elicited in this experiment was the number of circles in 
a visual display. This was selected as the perceptual paradigm made it simple to conduct a 
within-subjects design. That is, because the task remained the same across trials and largely 
unaffected by knowledge, it allowed tasks of equal difficulty in each condition – whereas a 
more typical, almanac-style, epistemic uncertainty task requires matching of question 
difficulty for a within-subjects design to be feasible. While this limits external validity, the 
estimation process was noted by an oil industry professional to share characteristics of a 
petro-physical analysis method known as point-counting used to estimate the proportion of 
different elements of a rock type (M. Sykes, personal communication, 2007) and the later 
experiments (2 and 3, herein) extend the MOLE to more typical elicitation tasks. 
An additional goal was a test of an assumption underlying the MOLE – that being that 
provision of a large number of values during elicitation would limit the impact of anchoring. 
Within the current design, this requires testing whether the first values provided by the 
MOLE act as anchors on participants responses. 
 





Participants were 40 undergraduate students from the University of Adelaide. Nine 
were excluded due to computer errors during testing or after examination of their responses 
revealed nonsensical responses, leaving 31 (9 male and 22 female) with a mean age of 20.1 
(SD = 1.9). Participants received a $10 book voucher for their participation. 
 
2.2.2 Materials 
Four graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were developed to enable automated testing of 
participants using each elicitation method. All GUIs displayed an array of circles, from 100 to 
300 (determined randomly at each trial) and elicited the participant’s beliefs regarding the 
number of circles - in accordance with the varying elicitation techniques. 
For each elicitation technique, the same basic GUI layout was used, with only the 
questions being asked and the response buttons differing. For example, Figure 2 shows the 
layout seen during More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE) condition, asking participants to select 
which of two values is closer to their estimate. GUI controls were sequentially locked and 
unlocked to ensure that participants answered each question before continuing to the next. 
 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Over the course of an hour, participants completed 10 trials under each of the four 
elicitation conditions - after being sorted at random into four groups to allow 
counterbalancing for possible order/learning effects, as shown in Table 1.  
Simple Elicitation. Here, participants were asked to provide a minimum and 
maximum value for the number of circles. Following this, they indicated how confident they 
were that their range contained the true value. This was done using a slider similar to the one 
seen in Figure 1 but capable of taking any integer value from 0 to 100% (NB – while a min to 
max range should reflect a 100% confidence interval, this was included as a check of whether 
participants genuinely considered the range they generated to be such). A person’s best guess 
in this task was estimated as the mid-point of their elicited range. 
Triangular Elicitation. In this condition, participants were asked to provide a best 
guess prior to giving their minimum and maximum values – thereby providing sufficient 
information to produce a triangular distribution. Again, after making estimates, they were 
asked to indicate their confidence on a 0-100% scale. 




Table 1. Ordering of Elicitation Methods 
Group Elicitation Methods 
A S T I M 
B M I T S 
C T M S I 
D I S M T 
Note: S=Simple, T=Triangular, I=Iterative, M=MOLE. These four orders were 
selected from the 24 unique possibilities as they form a balanced Latin Square, ensuring that 
every elicitation method is preceded and succeeded by every other once only. 
 
Iterative Elicitation. Here, participants were asked to provide an initial range as in the 
Simple Elicitation condition but then shown values for the minimum and maximum that lay 
outside their own range - described as having been elicited from “previous participants” but 
actually calculated by the program to lie outside their own range (60% of their initial 
minimum and 140% of the maximum). Participants were then given the chance to adjust their 
minimum and maximum estimates. Once happy with their estimates, they were asked to 
indicate their level of confidence that the true value would fall inside their final range on a 0 
to 100% range. As with the simple method, a person’s best guess in this task was taken as the 
mid-point of their (final) elicited range. 
More-Or-Less Elicitation. In the MOLE condition, participants did not directly 
estimate values. Rather, as described in section 1.4, they selected which alternative from a 
pair of values (randomly generated from a range from 0 to 400) was closer to their estimate. 
After each choice, participants were asked to indicate their confidence that their selection was 
actually closer to the true value than the alternative - on a 50% (guessing) to 100% (certain) 
range. This process was repeated 10 times during each trial, with the respondent’s confidence 
ratings used to determine the range of feasible values (i.e., those the participant’s answers did 
not rule out) and a person’s best guess. 
 
2.3 Results 
As described above, while overconfidence is generally used as the primary measure of 
the efficacy of an elicitation method of the sorts used herein, this can be further divided into 
TITLE: More-Or-Less Elicitation 
15 
 
the accuracy and the precision of the elicited responses. Results relating to the primary 
hypothesis (that repeated, relative judgments would result in superior estimates than 
traditional elicitation) are therefore described in terms of both overall 
calibration/overconfidence and the accuracy of their estimates. 
 
2.3.1 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is defined here as the difference between the expected and observed 
proportion of occasions when the range contains the true value. Figure 3 shows the average 
score out of 10 achieved by participants in each of the four conditions.  
It is clear from Figure 3 that all three techniques requiring participants to directly 
estimate ranges resulted in less than 30% of ranges containing the true value – with a 
comparison of the 95% confidence intervals around the means indicating little difference 
between them. By comparison, the MOLE, resulted in ~85% of ranges containing the true 
value.  
In all cases, the assumed confidence for comparison with these hit rates is 100% - as 
participants were asked for minimum to maximum ranges – yielding overconfidence  scores 
of between 72.9 and 77.7% for the three standard elicitation processes and 15.2% for the 
MOLE and means that, for analyses the overconfidence and hit rates can be used 
equivalently. 
While the magnitude of the differences in Figure 3 renders it moot, a repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted, confirming significant differences between the number of 
hits achieved by participants under the four conditions, F(3, 83) = 123.8, p <.001. Paired 
sample t-tests were conducted, post-hoc, for each unique pair of elicitation methods to 
determine which conditions were driving the significant ANOVA result. These indicated that 
only the MOLE condition differed significantly from the others, t(30) = 19.2, 16.9 and 14.9 
(from the Simple, Triangular and Iterative, respectively), p <<.001 in all cases.  
However, as noted above, there is some doubt that people interpret minimum and 
maximum labels as strongly as this when generating ranges and, as such, comparisons with 
people’s evaluations of their own ranges were also made for the three standard elicitation 
processes. People’s confidence that their range would contain the true value was: 73.8% 
(Iterative); 73.9% (Triangular); and 76% (Simple). Combining these values with the observed 
hit rates yields overconfidence scores of between 48.9 and 51.6%. (NB – the confidence level 
in the MOLE condition is assumed to be 100% as this method did not include direct rating of 
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the likelihood of the true value falling within their final range, rather it was assumed that their 
final range contained all of the values they considered feasible.) Using these overconfidence 
scores instead of those described above did not change the overall results, however – with the 
MOLE still producing significantly better calibration and the other three methods being 
largely equivalent. 
This appears to be driven largely by the difference in range widths between the 
conditions with the Simple, Triangular and Iterative methods all producing similar range 
widths (77.9, 71.9 and 83.6, with SD = 54.3, 45.0 and 59.7, respectively), while the MOLE 
produced significantly wider ones (263.9, SD = 132.7). That is, people in the direct elicitation 
methods produced ranges that were far too precise (given what they actually knew). In the 
MOLE, by contrast, while people reduced the width of their range from the starting point 
(i.e., 400), they tended not to do so by a large amount.  
Accuracy. To assess the objective accuracy of participants’ responses under each 
elicitation condition, the best guess from each elicited range (as described above) was 
compared with the true value. Scatterplots showing these data are included as Figure 4. 
Figure 4 suggests that only in the MOLE condition did participant estimates 
accurately track the number of objects in the stimuli. Across the 310 datapoints (31 
participants by 10 trials), the correlation between the means of the estimated range and true 
values was moderately high and highly significant, r= 0.64, p<.001, whereas correlations 
between the true values and the remaining elicited means were all near zero, r = -0.10, .06 
and 0.01 for the Simple, Triangular and Iterative method respectively, p > .05 in all cases. 
This analysis, however, was performed across all data points, meaning that differences in 
individual skill might reduce or obscure any correlation. Thus, Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of individual participants’ correlations. Analysis at this, individual, level 
however, yielded similar results, with the participants’ median correlation in the four 
conditions ranging from 0.79 (IQR=[.53 .90]) for the MOLE to .07 (IQR=[-.13.24])  for 
Triangular, .01(IQR=[-.31 .12])  for Simple and -.02 (IQR=[-.34 .21]) for Iterative.)  
 
2.3.2 Anchoring in the MOLE 
While no specific anchors were included, the first values displayed by the MOLE 
have the potential to act as such. If this occurred, one would expect a positive correlation 
between one or both of the initial values and the best estimate generated by the MOLE. To 
test this, correlations were calculated between each of the first pair of values displayed (the 
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low and high option) and the best estimate generated by the MOLE process for each of the 40 
participants across the 10 elicitations undertaken using the MOLE.  
In both cases, the median correlation between the best guess and first value was close 
to zero, r = .00 and .09, IQR = [-.30 .48] and [-.13 .33] for the initial low and high values 
respectively. Binomial tests confirmed that the number of positive correlations did not differ 
from what would be expected by chance alone: 20/40 for the initial low value, p = .563 (one-
tailed); and 24/40 for the initial high value, p = .134 (one-tailed).  
 
2.3.3 Other Findings 
Best Guesses and Overconfidence. As noted above, the triangular method was 
included to determine whether requiring participants to give a best guess prior to fixing their 
confidence interval’s end-points would affect its width and thus their levels of 
overconfidence – as previous research on this question has been mixed. 
Looking at the data in Figure 3, however, one sees little difference between the hit 
rates provided in the two conditions of interest (Simple and Triangular). Participants in the 
Triangular condition did give, on average, narrower ranges (M = 84.7, SD = 61.8) than they 
did in the Simple condition (M = 100.3, SD = 105.0) but the analyses above indicate no 
significant difference between overall performance in terms of overconfidence.  
Iterative Elicitation. The Iterative method was included to see whether participants 
could be prompted to reconsider and widen their ranges by providing them with reasons to 
reconsider values outside their initially estimated range. Looking again at Figure 3 however, 
one sees little evidence in line with expectations - participants’ performance in two 
conditions being near identical.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
Our results show a clear benefit of the MOLE technique for both the calibration and 
accuracy of elicited ranges. We found little support, however, for the role of initial best 
guesses or simple counter-intuitive values in improving elicitations – the latter observation 
being in line with Ferretti et al.’s (2016) results. 
Further – and in line with the assumption underlying the MOLE’s design -  the values 
provided at the beginning of the task have no discernible effect on the final estimates. That is, 
there is no evidence of participants anchoring on either of the first pair of values seen. While 
not a direct test of the MOLE’s proposed mechanism for avoiding anchoring bias (i.e., the 
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provision of multiple values), the absence of the typically robust (see, e.g., Mussweiler, 2002) 
anchoring effect in our results would seem to lend the hypothesis support. 
 
2.4.1 Caveats  
There are, however, some caveats regarding the MOLE method as used in Experiment 
1a. Firstly, the MOLE process necessarily resulted in participants spending more time 
observing the stimulus and thus some of the effect may simply be noise reduction – although 
this would seem only to explain improvements in accuracy, not overconfidence. The MOLE 
also requires more effort per trial, which resulted in more participants being excluded based 
on their failure to sensibly complete the MOLE than the other conditions. (Of course, this is, 
unlikely to cause a problem in applied settings where experts are undertaking tasks relevant 
to their roles and where multiple parameters tend not to be elicited simultaneously as was 
done for the purposes of the experiment). 
Additionally, given that the stimulus display set out its circles in rows and columns, 
the additional time in the MOLE condition could, potentially, have allowed participants to 
more accurately gauge or even count the circles– although no evidence of this seen during 
testing. 
A third concern relates to the best estimates calculated in the Simple and Iterative 
conditions from the mid-point of the participant’s range - assuming a symmetrical 
distribution. In fact, the Triangular data showed some right skew with 53% of ranges 
extending further towards the high side, 19% symmetrical and 38% extending further to the 
low side. This suggests that best estimates for the Simple and Iterative conditions might be 
better modelled assuming a non-symmetrical distribution. In practical terms, however, this 
seems relatively minor as the Triangular data was not significantly more accurate than these 
alternatives. 
Finally, the very poor performance of participants on the non-MOLE tasks warrants 
comment as the lack of correlations between estimate and actual values suggests that they 
either found the task extremely difficult or were unmotivated. (It should be noted, though, 
that the observation that the MOLE produced viable estimates even under such trying 
circumstances supports the idea of an elicitation process based around how people are best 
able to make judgements.) 
At an individual level, some participants did show some evidence of better estimation 
with correlations ranging up to 0.82 in the Iterative condition but negative correlations 
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seemed as likely overall. Beyond questions of ability and motivation, it is also possible that 
this could results from people revising their order of magnitude part-way through the task– 
for example, if a person, on beginning the task, thought that estimates in the 100-200 range 
were appropriate but then, after seeing several trials, changed this to estimates in the 300-400 
range, this  could result in a set of responses with a high and a low cluster of estimates – each 
having a positive correlation within it but showing no overall correlation because the high 
estimates in the low cluster are lower than the low estimates of the high cluster. 
This could account for the few outlying values observed in Figure 4 where some 
estimates above 400 were observed in the direct elicitation methods; which were prevented 
by the MOLE’s preset range of 0-400. These values, while rare and having no overall effect 
on the accuracy of estimates in the direct elicitation methods, could reflect instances where 
people changed the magnitude of their responses. 
 
3. Experiment 1b: Overconfidence in Perceptual Uncertainty 2 
3.1 Aims and Objectives 
The results of Experiment 1a supported the idea that the MOLE is superior method to 
traditional range estimation. There were, however, questions arising out of the results – 
specifically, as regards the repeated judgments aspects of the task. 
The MOLE method seems well suited to offer a way of enabling multiple judgments 
to be gained from a single individual while avoiding typical problems with repeated 
judgements from an individual. How much of this benefit could be achieved using other 
repeated judgment methods, however, needs to be answered in order to determine whether it 
is just repetition or the combination of the MOLE’s four underlying principles (repetition, 
relative judgments, multiple values to foil anchoring and the ‘outside-in’ range construction) 
that provides the benefit. It is also necessary to assess whether the benefit of ‘repeated 
measures’ in the MOLE results simply from the additional time spent by participants 
examining a stimulus figure laid out in neat rows and columns. 
This study, therefore, aimed to show whether the benefit resulting from using the 
MOLE technique is equivalent to the use of other potential methods for obtaining repeated 
judgments from a single individual - through direct repetition of the task or repetition with 
distractor tasks so as to attempt to avoid problems with participants being anchored by or 
attempting to confirm their earlier estimates repeating values. (These tasks, necessarily, took 
as long or longer than the MOLE to complete and, as such, were also expected to indicate 
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whether the superiority of the MOLE resulted solely from noise reduction due to increased 
time spent on each elicitation task.) It was hypothesised that the MOLE would still provide a 
benefit over and above that yielded by repetition with distraction which would, in turn prove 
superior to simple repetition. 
A secondary adjustment to the design from Experiment 1a was to include a small 





Forty-two participants were recruited; including graduate (12) and undergraduate 
students (18), university graduates (9) and a small number of non-university educated people 
(3). Seventeen participants were male and 25 female, with mean age of 28.7 (SD = 8.9). Each 
received a $10 book voucher for their participation. 
 
3.2.2 Materials 
As in Experiment 1a, graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were designed - one for each 
experimental condition - displaying a random array of between 100 and 300 circles at each 
trial but differing in terms of the responses available to participants.  
Figure 6 shows the MOLE GUI as it appeared during a trial – displaying a random 
array of circles and asking the participant to select which of two numbers they believe is 
closer to the true number of circles. The other two GUIs, “Repeated” and “Interleaved”, were 
variants on the Simple method described in Experiment 1a. The primary difference between 
these and the MOLE GUI was that, rather than selecting presented alternatives, participants 
were asked to enter minimum and maximum estimates for the number of circles into editable 
text boxes. They then rated how confident they were that the true value would fall in that 
range using a 0-100% slider. 
 
3.2.3 Procedure 
A within-subjects design was used, with participants completing all three tasks in a 
single session in an order determined by a Latin Square design. Participants were allowed a 
short (2 minute) break between conditions while the experimenter checked that the data had 
saved and started the next part of the experiment.  A single trial was conducted under each 
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condition and most participants completed the task in less than 40 minutes; none taking more 
than an hour. 
Mole Procedure. The MOLE GUI worked exactly as described in Experiment 1a with 
the exception that participants here completed only a single trial. 
Repeated Procedure. The Repeated GUI also presented a single random array of 100-
300 circles that remained visible throughout the trial. Participants were asked to enter a 
minimum and maximum number representing the range that they thought the true number of 
circles would fall within. After this, participants were also asked to give a confidence rating 
for how likely it was that the true value would fall within the range they had just generated. 
While each participant saw only one array of circles in this condition, they were asked 
to give their minimum and maximum value 10 times – having been instructed that we were 
interested in seeing whether prolonged exposure to the stimulus led them to revise their 
estimates but that, if it did not, they were free to enter the same numbers on each trial. 
Interleaved Procedure. The Interleaved GUI differed from the others in that it presented a 
series of stimulus displays rather than just one. Specifically, forty arrays of between 100 and 
300 circles were presented and participants were asked to give a minimum and maximum 
number of circles (with confidence rating) for each. 
Ten of the 40 arrays, however, were repetitions of a single array – such that 
participants in this condition completed essentially the same task as during the Repeated 
condition. These repeat arrays were distributed in a pseudo-random manner throughout 30 
distractor trials to prevent participants seeing two identical arrays immediately adjacent or 
noticing any simple pattern (i.e., not every fourth trial). By interleaving the experimental 
trials amongst distractor trials, it was expected that some problems with repeated judgment 
could be overcome.  
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Data Manipulation 
Outlier Removal. During analysis, discrepancies were observed between a 
participant’s statements regarding their beliefs (made during testing) and the estimates 
recorded by the GUIs. Specifically, the number of circles that participant said they believed 
most likely was not included within their final range. This was taken to indicate that they had 
either misunderstood the instructions or accidentally entered the wrong value. To prevent this 
and other, unnoticed, errors from impacting results, all participants’ data were analysed and 
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removed if the error in their estimate on any of the three tasks was identified as an outlier – 
that is, lying more than 1.5 interquartile ranges above the third quartile (Hodge & Austin, 
2004). In all, six participants were identified as having unusually inaccurate estimates in at 
least one condition and their data were excluded from the subsequent analyses. 
Estimated Range: For the MOLE, a person’s estimated range was calculated as 
described for Experiment 1a. For the other conditions, their final range was taken to run from 
the lowest minimum value they provided on any trial to their highest maximum. 
Best Estimates. Participants’ responses were used to generate their best estimates as 
well as their intervals. The process used to generate the best estimate from the MOLE data 
was exactly as described above. 
In the Repeated and Interleaved conditions, by comparison, a somewhat simpler 
(although related) method of best guess calculation was used. As each participant had 
estimated 10 ranges (Minimum to Maximum) for a given stimulus, the participant’s overall, 
best guess was taken to be simply the average of the midpoints of their ten ranges. 
 
3.3.2 Comparison of Elicitation Methods 
To compare elicitation methods a number of measures are required - assessing both 
the accuracy of estimates and the adequacy of estimated ranges. For accuracy, correlations 
between the true and estimated number of circles were calculated, along with absolute 
percentage error. Calibration, on the other hand, was examined by comparing the proportion 
of ranges that contained the true value (hits) and the assumed confidence level of 100%. (NB 
– as was the case in Experiment 1a, participants evaluated the chances of their own ranges in 
the Repeated and Interleaved conditions containing the true value – at 74.3% and 73.1% on 
average – but these ratings apply to individual ranges rather than the final, composite range.) 
Table 2 summarizes these key statistics across elicitation techniques.  
Table 2. Summary of elicitation technique performance. 
 Accuracy Calibration 
Technique r |% Error| % Hits Confidence 
Repeated 0.44 31.3 (22.9) 69.4 100 
Interleaved 0.49 23.5 (20.1) 88.9 100 
MOLE 0.66 22.4 (15.8) 91.2 100 
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Accuracy of Elicitation Methods. Figure 7 shows scatterplots between estimates made 
in each condition and the true value. Looking at this, one can see that estimates from all 
conditions show evidence of some degree of accuracy – with a positive correlation between 
the estimates and the true value, varying  from 0.44 in the Repeated condition to 0.66 in the 
MOLE. All of these correlations are significant at the .01 level and the MOLE results are 
significant at p <.001, suggesting that estimates elicited using the MOLE may be better 
predictors of the true value (although, given the small sample, these correlation coefficients 
are not statistically distinguishable)  
A correlational study, however, while indicating the strength and direction of a 
relationship misses a key factor in determining accuracy – the fit between the ideal and the 
observed data, represented in Figure 7 by the dotted line.  
Looking at column 2 of Table 2, one sees the percentage error scores for participants 
in each elicitation method. Again, the MOLE technique is the most accurate, with a mean 
error of 22.4%. The Interleaved method does almost as well, with a mean error of 23.5%, 
while the Repeated is, again, the worst with a mean error of 31.3%. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA, conducted comparing these results, found a significant result, F(2,70) = 2.41, p = 
.016 (one-tailed). Paired sample t-tests were used, post-hoc, to identify the conditions driving 
this results. These indicated that, the MOLE and Interleaved methods produced better results 
than the Repeated, t(35) = 1.81 and 1.70, p = .020 and .025 (one-tailed), respectively. 
Calibration. In all three conditions, participants made confidence judgments after 
every individual judgement (selection between options or estimation of range). These 
confidence ratings, however, do not directly relate to the overall confidence that the true 
value will fall within the final range calculated from a participant’s responses. Instead, as was 
done with the MOLE results in Experiment 1, the final range is treated as a 100% confidence 
interval when calculating overconfidence for each technique. The calibration data for the 
three techniques is shown in Table 2. 
Looking at Table 2, one sees the MOLE produced the best calibrated results, with 
91.2% of the composite ranges containing the true value (c.f. 90.6% in Experiment 1a). By 
comparison, the Interleaved condition ranges contained the true value 88.9% of the time and 
the Repeated condition 69.4%. The hit and miss rates were compared using a Cochran’s Q 
Test, which confirmed a significant difference, Q(2) = 9.5, p = .009. McNemar’s tests were 
used, post-hoc, to determine which conditions were driving this result. These indicated that 
the MOLE produced superior outcomes to the Repeated but not the Interleaved condition, 
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χ2(1) = 8 and 0.2, p = .002 and .327 (one-tailed). The difference between performance on the 
Interleaved and Repeated conditions was also significant, χ2(1) = 4.45, p = .0174 (one-tailed). 
Time. Looking at Table 3, the MOLE is easily the fastest technique, taking an average 
of just 3 minutes to complete. The Repeated method also fares relatively well, taking between 
4 and 5 minutes to complete while the Interleaved method required an average of more than 
17 minutes to complete. Of course, this is not surprising given that the Interleaved condition 
required four times as many judgments to be made as the Repeated – thereby ending up four 
times as long and suggesting that people in the two conditions examined the target stimulus 
for the same amount of time. It does, however, argue against the possibility that mere 
exposure could account for the MOLE’s performance in Experiment 1a. 
A repeated measures ANOVA confirmed the significance of the differences in time 
taken, F(2, 70) = 194.8, p < .001, and paired sample t-tests, used post-hoc, indicated that all 
three conditions differed significantly from one another, t(35) = 13.5, 6.1 and 14.6, for the R 
vs I, R vs M and I vs M comparisons respectively, p <.001 in each case. 
 
Table 3. Time to complete task by condition 
Condition Mean Time (secs) SD 
Repeated 252 87 
Interleaved 1033 377 
MOLE 180 90 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
The results offer support for the use of repeated judgments in elicitation tasks – in line 
with expectations. The Repeated method, subject to the standard problems with repeated 
individual judgments was the worst performer. It was, however, superior to the equivalent 
Experiment 1a results, indicating that even making repeated judgements in situations where 
the participant knew they were judging the same stimulus again and again helps in improving 
estimates – whether due to changes in beliefs across the task or simply greater exposure time. 
However, the Interleaved method, which aimed to avoid the problem of participant 
awareness of the repetition by locating the experimental trials within a series of distractor 
tasks, yielded a larger benefit (small increase in accuracy and significant decrease in 
overconfidence) with the same exposure time of the target stimulus. That is, ensuring the 
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independence of estimates increases the benefit seen from repetition – in line with previous 
research (Vul & Pashler, 2008). 
Overall, the MOLE method was the most accurate, generated less overconfident 
ranges and took the least time to complete – although only on the last was its advantage over 
the Interleaved significant. It is also, however, generalizable to domains where the 
Interleaved approach is untenable (e.g., Experiments 2 and 3 described herein). 
The observation that the MOLE produces the best results while taking the least time 
to complete also undermines the suggestion raised following Experiment 1a, that the 
advantage of the MOLE over the traditional range elicitation techniques resulted simply from 
noise reduction due to participants spending longer looking at the stimulus. 
 
3.4.1 Caveats  
Despite the results, there is a limitation that should be addressed. Specifically, 
whether people in the Interleaved condition realized that one stimulus was repeating. If this 
was the case, then the potential benefit of repeated judgments would be reduced by the same 
effects restricting the benefits in the Repeated condition. One participant did state they 
believed that the arrays in the Interleaved condition were repeating but the much wider ranges 
in the Interleaved condition - compared to the Repeated - argues against this having been a 
common feeling. 
The similarity between the MOLE and Interleaved results is also worth commenting 
on. Given the Interleaved process produced results nearly as good as the MOLE – in fact, 
statistically indistinguishable within our small sample – it is worth considering whether the 
‘blind repetition’ aspect of the MOLE is the primary driver of its superiority over more basic, 
direct elicitation methods like those in Experiment 1a. That is, whether the other aspects 
(retaining uncertainty, relative judgements and washing out any anchors) are less important. 
To answer this, larger, more powerful studies will be required to determine whether the 
MOLE retains its current advantage in terms of its accuracy (i.e., the higher correlation). 
 
4. Experiment 2: Overconfidence in Epistemic Uncertainty 
4.1 Aims and Objectives 
Perceptual stimuli were used in Experiments 1a and 1b to allow production of a task 
on which individual differences in participant knowledge would be irrelevant and which 
would allow use of repeated measures (and thus within-subjects designs) in a way that a more 
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traditional elicitation questions would not. However, given that the majority of elicitation 
research is undertaken on epistemic uncertainty (where the task is to recall information from 
memory in order to answer a question) these results could be argued to have limited 
generalizability. Therefore this study seeks to confirm the MOLE’s benefit over alternative 
elicitation methods when used to elicit answers to questions where participants are relying on 
knowledge and memory rather than perception. 
A secondary consideration for this experiment was to test whether the MOLE’s use of 
initial, starting ranges was providing an unfair benefit – by restricting the magnitude of errors 




Participants were 60 university students and members of the general public, 27 male 
and 33 female with a mean age of 25.3, (SD = 8.9). Each received a $20 book voucher for 
their time. In addition, to encourage accuracy, an additional $20 voucher was promised to the 
best performing participant from each condition. 
 
4.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were sorted randomly into one of three conditions, coded as separate 
Matlab GUIs. Each presented, in a random order, the same 15 almanac-style questions with 
numerical answers ranging from 14.5 (% of world population living in Africa) to more than 
1.7 million (area of the Australian State of Queensland in km2). Such questions are used to 
create epistemic uncertainty – as participants are unlikely to know the correct answer but are 
likely to have some knowledge that can be used to generate a non-random estimate. 
Five of these questions had answers that were percentages and, thus, had clear preset 
ranges (0-100) for all participants’ responses. The remaining 10 questions were divided into 
two groups – designated Double and Quintuple according to whether the MOLE GUI used a 
range from zero to double the true value or zero to five times the true value as its preset 
range. Each of these two groups had questions from across the full range of magnitude and 
were selected as being of similar difficulty.  
MOLE. The MOLE GUI was essentially identical to that described for Experiments 
1a and 1b, except that, instead of an array of circles, participants saw a single question 
presented, which remained visible throughout. The only difference from the Experiment 1 
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method was the inclusion of a final, evaluation step where people were presented with the 
range calculated by the MOLE and asked to evaluate how confident they were that the true 
value would fall within this. 
MMM. This condition (labelled MMM for minimum, maximum and most likely) was 
similar to the ‘triangular’ elicitation method from Experiment 1a except that the range was 
elicited prior to the best guess. This procedure was used as it gives a range estimate 
unaffected by the best guess but also yields a direct measure of the participant’s best guess. 
As with the MOLE GUI, the question remained visible while all estimates were made. 
Dialectical.  The final condition was similar to the ‘iterative’ condition from 
Experiment 1a but drew upon Herzog and Herwig’s (2009) observations regarding the use of 
dialectical processes in improving point estimates. For uncertainty elicitation, however, the 
key improvement needs to be in the range rather than the best guess and, as such, the 
dialectical process was used to revise the range. Specifically, after a participant made a set of 
estimates exactly as they would in the MMM condition, they were asked to: 1, consider the 
possibility that their range did not contain the true value; 2, indicate whether the true value 
was more likely to lie above or below their range; and, 3, revise their minimum and 
maximum following this thought experiment before providing their confidence estimate. 
The majority of participants completed the experiment in 30 minutes or less. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Comparisons between elicitation methods 
To compare the elicitation methods, participants’ confidence (that their range would 
contain the true value) and calibration scores (percentage of ranges containing the true 
answer to each question) were calculated participants. These, along with the average time 
taken to complete a question are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 shows the MOLE produces the best-calibrated ranges, with participants’ 
ranges containing the true value 72% of the time. Participants were, however, still 
overconfident, whether considering the expected 100% confidence interval or the evaluated 
confidence level, which indicated that participants expected their ranges to contain the true 
value ~86% of the time. That is, overconfidence is either 28% or 14%, depending on whether 
one uses the expected or evaluated confidence. 
This was a superior result to that seen in either of the direct elicitation methods, where 
participants’ ranges contained the true value less than 40% of the time but were predicted to 
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~65% of the time, which yields overconfidence scores of 60% or 25% - approximately 
double the bias seen in the MOLE results.  
 
Table 4 Performance by elicitation method (means and SDs) 
 Seconds/Question Calibration 
Technique  % Hits Confidence 
MMM 39.2 (24.2) 37.3 (15.7) 67.3 (27.6) 
Dial. 53.5 (28.5) 38.7 (13.8) 64.7 (28.6) 
MOLE 90.3 (110.7) 72.0 (9.6) 85.7 (19.9) 
* - Data is calculated from 20 participants in each group across 15 questions  
– thus N=300 for the time and confidence  measures but N=20 for calibration  
as this is calculated across all 15 questions seen by an individual. 
 
As noted in previous experiments, however, calibration is not the only measure an 
elicitor might be interested in. As was the case in Experiment 1, correlations between the true 
and estimated answers were calculated, showing a clear advantage for the MOLE, with a 
Spearman correlation of 0.76, CI95= [.52 .91], over the Dialectical and MMM methods (rho = 
0.07 and 0.34, respectively) – although, given a set of only 15 questions and the orders-of-
magnitude differences between their answers (and errors in estimation), these are, at best, 
unreliable measures of the accuracy of participants’ estimates. 
 
Table 5. Absolute error by condition. 
 Mean  SD Median  IQR 
MMM 200.4  3444 48.21 [16.0 - 94.2] 
Dial. 1199.0  20667 50.38 [20.8 – 91.6] 
MOLE 85.5  101.8 53.84 [19.5 – 88.2] 
 
As an additional measure of the accuracy of participants estimates across the three 
conditions, the mean and median % absolute errors were calculated – that is: 100* |True – 
Estimate| / True. These values are shown in Table 5 where one sees that, in terms of their 
median values and interquartile ranges of the absolute error, the three techniques are largely 
indistinguishable - with all showing a median error of around 50%. In terms of their mean 
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error, however, the MOLE has a strong advantage, with far fewer extreme values skewing the 
results. That is, the advantage of the MOLE seems to stem from its prevention of estimates 
that are out by large amounts (in either direction). 
 
4.3.2 Effect of preset ranges on elicited ranges and values 
A possible objection to the previous experiments’ conclusions was that the use of 
preset ranges might be the primary cause of the MOLE’s advantage. Three different types of 
questions were used in this experiment to test this question; specifically, with preset ranges of 
0-100 (Percentage), 0-2x the true value (Double) and 0-5x the true value (Quintuple). The 
expectation being that, if the MOLE’s advantage lies in its use of preset ranges, then 
manipulating these ranges will affect it disproportionately. Specifically, one would expect no 
advantage for the MOLE in the percentage questions (as participants in all conditions have 
the same preset range) and a stronger advantage in the double questions than the quintuple 
questions (as the former restrict high estimates to a greater extent and has a mean - of the 
initial distribution of possible options - equal to the true value). Of course, the Double and 
Quintuple questions sets actually only differ from one another in the MOLE condition, 
meaning that the difference between these within the MMM and Dialectical methods are 
expected to be null. That is, there should be no difference between these question-types for 
these elicitation methods but possibly a difference in the MOLE – meaning an interaction 
effect would be illuminating. 
Figure 8, displaying the mean confidence and calibration for each type of question 
and elicitation method, shows a clear advantage of the MOLE method in both confidence and 
calibration across all three questions types – a result confirmed by two 3x3 (condition by 
question-type) mixed design ANOVA with question type as the within-subjects factor, 
conducted for confidence and calibration.  
Starting with confidence, this found significant main effects of both condition, 
F(2,57)=6.9 p =.002, and question type, F(2,114)=13.0, p=.001 and indicated no interaction 
between these, F(2,57)=0.85, p = .433. Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that the significant 
difference in condition was due to participants in the MOLE condition being more confident 
than those in the other two conditions, p = .04 and .012. Similarly, the effect of question type 
was found, post-hoc, to result from the difference between the percentage-type questions and 
the other two types. 
The ANOVA run for calibration found significant effects of condition, question type 
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and the interaction between the two, F(2,57) = 209.2, F(2,114) = 10.2 and F(4,114) = 6.2, p < 
.001 in all cases. Post-hoc analyses confirmed that the MOLE resulted in significantly higher 
calibration than the other two elicitation conditions, p ≤ .001 and that the Quintuple-type 
questions resulted in significantly lower calibration than the other two types, p = .006 and p < 
.001, for the Double- and Percentage-types respectively. This is of interest as it implies that 
the questions in the Quintuple set may have proved harder than those in the double set, 
despite people’s equal confidence. Otherwise, one would expect the calibration of 
participants in the DIAL And MMM conditions to be equal between these question types. 
Returning to Figure 8, it seems likely that the interaction effect is resulting from the 
unexpectedly low calibration achieved in the MOLE condition on the Percentage-type 
questions. In this, particular, combination of condition and question type, the degree of 
overconfidence in the MOLE is quite similar to that seen in the other two conditions (20% 
compared to 18% and 25%), which could be interpreted as being in line with the prediction 
the MOLE would have no advantage on questions of this type. However, the other result 
expected if the use of preset ranges benefits the MOLE (a greater advantage in the double 
than the quintuple questions) is not observed; instead, the greatest advantage of the MOLE is 
in the quintuple questions (12% overconfidence compared to 32% and 41%).  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In general, the results of this experiment confirm the benefits of the MOLE procedure, 
despite the change from perceptual to epistemic uncertainty and from a within- to a between-
subjects design. Specifically, the MOLE method resulted in both much better calibration 
compared to the alternative measures (~14% overconfidence compared to 28% and 30% for 
Dial. and MMM, respectively). By contrast, the dialectical method failed to show any 
significant benefit over the simple range plus best guess elicitation (MMM) – although Figure 
8 suggests the dialectical method might weakly reduce confidence.  
The accuracy of point estimates calculated using the MOLE method was also superior 
to direct estimates made by participants in the alternative elicitation methods - reducing the 
number of wildly wrong estimates – although it should be noted that participants found the 
questions hard and answers in all conditions regularly differed significantly from the truth.  
Finally, the attempts to identify any role of the preset range in the advantage the 
MOLE enjoys were inconclusive. As noted above, the MOLE had less advantage in terms of 
overconfidence on the Percentage-type questions (as confidence and calibration scores were 
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both around 20% higher than in the other conditions, which is in line with a hypothesis 
holding that the preset range is responsible for the MOLE’s advantage. If this were the entire 
story, however, one would also expect the Double–type questions to have an advantage over 
the Quintuple, whereas the opposite was observed. A possible confound lies in the within-
subjects design, which necessitated using different questions in the Double and Quintuple 
conditions, with the result that they may not of equivalent difficulty. Future work could 
examine this more closely using the same questions with different starting range widths for 
the MOLE in a between-subjects design. 
Even with that caveat, however, the fact that the MOLE also results in far fewer 
extremely low estimates also argues against the preset range being the sole cause of it 
superiority – particularly as regards accuracy. That is, the MOLE’s preset range allows for 
low values just as inaccurate as the other methods but these are not observed. Finally, it 
should also be noted that, in terms of predictive power, 67% from 87%  is a superior result to 
~50% from ~70% (to understand why, consider the extreme case where 0% of ranges contain 
the true value when 20% are expected to). That is, given the same degree of overconfidence, 
we should prefer the estimates of people with higher confidence and calibration scores and, 
taking this into account the MOLE can, justifiably, be argued to be superior to either 
alternative using all three question types. 
 
5. Experiment 3: Overconfidence in Forecasting 
5.1 Aims and Objectives 
This experiment compared MOLE’s calibration on a forecasting task with direct 
elicitation wherein participants provided minimum and maximum estimates. Given that 
perhaps the majority of important elicitation problems involve the forecasting of future 
values, it was regarded as important to establish whether the advantage observed for the 
MOLE on perceptual and epistemic tasks remained on a forecasting task, where participants 
estimate ranges they are confident will contain the true value that a parameter of interest will 
take at a specified point in the future. 
It is important to note that this design, with testing across an extended period and yet 
with all participants making forecasts across the same duration, results in individual results 
being dependent on the volatility of the parameters across that period. That is, participants 
using the same starting value on different days and making the same range estimate may end 
up with different calibration scores as a result of the true value on the target days differing. A 
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Participants were 158 oil industry personnel employed in the US (n =115) and UK (n 
= 43). While, for confidentiality reasons, demographic data were not collected, previous work 
suggests a mean age of ~40 and an average of 15 years of industry experience is typical; as is 
a 3 or 4:1 male to female ratio (see, e.g., Welsh et al., 2006; Welsh, Bratvold, & Begg, 2005). 
Given the involved companies’ interest in seeing results for their personnel, all participants 
willing to participate were accepted, rather than determining numbers in advance. However, 
analyses were not begun until all data collection was complete within a given location. 
 
5.2.2 Materials 
The MOLE and direct estimation methods both asked participants 10 questions 
regarding the values of 5 commodities/shares at times 7 and 28 days following testing. Two 
equivalent question sets were developed – labelled Gold and Silver after the first commodity 
included in each, as seen in Table 6. Some of these (e.g., oil and gas price and company share 
price) were selected as being directly relevant to participants’ work; others as indices that 
industry professionals might have cause to follow for investment reasons (precious metals 
and stock indices); and the remainder (temperature, rainfall and windspeed at a nearby 
location) as variables that any local person could make a reasonable attempt at forecasting. 
For the US participants, the quiz questions were coded into a graphical user interface 
(GUI) for delivery via the MOLE but delivered as a paper and pencil test for the direct 
estimation. For the UK participants, both the MOLE and direct estimation methods were 
delivered via GUI. Figure 9 shows the GUI as it appears during elicitation using MOLE, with 
the inclusion (for the first time) of an ‘Unselect’ button that allowed participants to change 
the option they had selected in cases where they had accidentally pressed the wrong button. 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in small groups (2-4) at company offices over a period of 
approximately 1 month – in each country. Which quiz a participant undertook under each 
elicitation method was determined randomly. That is, approximately half of participants 
completed the Gold quiz using the MOLE and Silver using the standard elicitation, while the 
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remainder did the reverse. Which of the methods was delivered first was also randomized.  
Standard Elicitation Procedure 
Under the standard elicitation condition, participants were asked to give ranges they 
were certain would contain the true value of the parameters of interest at the specified time. 
That is, they were asked for minimum and maximum values.  
These were either recorded on a paper copy of the quiz or entered directly into the 
GUI. Prior to testing, participants were asked to record the current value of the parameter of 
interest – to ensure that they had some idea of what the true value was and thus better reflect 
real forecasting tasks where people forecast values that they are familiar with. 
It was decided not to ask participants for a best guess as this affects the width of 
elicited ranges in complex ways (see, e.g., Block & Harper, 1991; Heywood-Smith et al., 
2008), including the suggestion that it affects ranges differentially according to a person’s 
level of expertise (Bruza et al., 2011). 
 
Table 6. Commodities/parameters by quiz. 
Q. Forecast Window Quiz 1 (Gold) Quiz 2 (Silver) 
1 7 days Gold price Silver price 
2 28 days Gold price Silver price 
3 7 days Maximum Temp Minimum Temp 
4 28 days Maximum Temp Minimum Temp 
5 7 days Rainfall total Wind Speed 
6 28 days Rainfall total Wind Speed 
7 7 days Share price Share index 
8 28 days Share price Share index 
9 7 days Oil price Gas price 
10 28 days Oil price Gas price 
NB – the specific values asked from varied across locations. E.g., the Share price asked for 
was for each participant’s own company and the share index was for their country of 
residence (Dow Jones for US; FTSE100 for UK).  
 
MOLE Procedure 
As no true values existed at the time of the experiment, the MOLE required the 
experimenter to set initial bounds on the range of values that the computer would use – based 
on extrapolations of historical data or natural limits (where available). The bounds used for 
the different quiz questions are shown in Table 7. Note that some were based on the 
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parameter’s current value while others were based on historical data. In both cases, however, 
the participant was tasked with entering the current value into the MOLE GUI immediately 
prior to the elicitation beginning. In this way, participants were assured of knowing 
something about the parameter in question. The only other difference from previous versions 
of the MOLE was that the participants rated their confidence in their choice on a verbal scale 
from guessing to very high1 (as seen in Figure 9) rather than 50-100%. 
Given the use of a simple, range elicitation as the comparison condition, best guess 
values were not calculated for this experiment. Participants were not made aware of the 
underlying MOLE algorithm or its starting ranges, ensuring that attempts to ‘game the 
system’ would be made blind. 
 
Table 7. Initial bounds for MOLE process. 
 US UK 
Q. Gold Silver Gold Silver 
1 ±5% ±5% ±10% ±10% 
2 ±10% ±10% ±10% ±10% 
3 30-110F 30-110F -20-40C -20-40C 
4 30-100F 30-110F -20-40C -20-40C 
5 0-7 in. 0-60 mph 0-100mm 0-90kmph 
6 0-20 in. 0-60 mph 0-200mm 0-90kmph 
7 ±5% ±5% ±5% ±5% 
8 ±10% ±10% ±10% ±10% 
9 ±5% ±10% ±5% ±10% 
10 ±10% ±20% ±10% ±20% 
Note: ±% indicates bounds were calculated from the current value of the parameter. Note 2: 
the UK 7-day bounds are, in places, wider than their US equivalents as detailed below. 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Methodological Concerns 
The US sample was collected several months before the UK sample and, as such, 
observations from this were used to update our process for determining bounds. Specifically, 
                                                 
1 This scale was mapped over the top of the 50% - 100% confidence scale used in previous versions of the MOLE – as a 
result of discussions with the companies providing participants. While this, necessarily, reduces our ability to interpret results, 
it should be noted that the effect of this can only be to narrow ranges when the numerical scale might otherwise leave it intact. 
Thus, this change can only hinder the MOLE. 
TITLE: More-Or-Less Elicitation 
35 
 
it was observed that the bounds used for the Silver price underestimated the volatility in the 
market – preventing a number of participants from being able to capture the true value in 
their final ranges, no matter what choices they made during the MOLE. In light of this, 
ranges used for the UK sample were widened on this question and analyses exclude this 
question from the US dataset. Otherwise, the differences in bounds reflect differences in 
expected weather for the participants’ local areas and changes of units from metric to 
imperial where appropriate. 
Another methodological concern was the possibility that the change from a numerical 
to verbal labels on the MOLE GUI’s confidence slider might negatively impact the MOLE’s 
performance. As noted below, however, the calibration observed in this experiment was very 
similar to that achieved by the MOLE in previous experiments. As such, this change appears 
not to have any significant effect and is not discussed further. 
 
5.3.2 Equivalency of Quizzes 
Given the differences in questions answered by the two samples, described above, 
individual analyses (i.e., t-tests) were used within each sample in preference to a 2x2 
ANOVA comparing the groups and time-frames simultaneously. Apart from the effect noted 
above for the silver question, the US sample’s performance on the questions from the Gold 
and Silver quizzes was statistically equivalent. Calibration on the ‘Gold’ and ‘Silver’ 
question sets was compared for both 7 day and 28 forecasts using Welch’s t-tests. These 
showed no difference between people’s calibration on the two sets of questions, M = 82.8 and 
84.0, t(228) = 0.42, p = 0.674 on the 7 day forecasts and M = 84.0 and 85.7, t(228) = 0.58, p 
= 0.566 on the 28 day forecasts. 
The UK sample is slightly more complex in that, while there is no observed difference 
between participants’ performance on the Gold and Silver quizzes under the MOLE, there is 
one using the standard elicitation method, with the average calibration being 20% lower on 
the Gold quiz. On examination of the data, it was noted that, during the period of testing for 
the UK sample, the parameters on the Gold quiz happened to be markedly more variable than 
those on the Silver quiz. The average difference between the minimum and maximum values 
observed for the various parameters across the date range (i.e., D = (Max-Min)/Max) was 
0.37 for the Gold quiz compared to 0.22 for the Silver. 
In light of the larger US sample’s results, however, it was decided that this did not call 
into question the equivalency of the questions, per se. 





Given differences between the UK and US samples question sets and differences in 
starting commodity values (and thus MOLE starting ranges) across the duration of the 
experiment, the actual widths of ranges are not directly comparable in this experiment. 
Therefore, analyses focus on calibration: calculated as the proportion of ranges containing the 
true value (given that 100% confidence intervals were elicited). Figures 10 and 11 show 
mean calibration by forecast window and elicitation condition for the US and UK samples, 
respectively.  
Looking at Figure 10, one sees two very clear results. The first is that the forecast 
length did not affect calibration – with little difference seen between the 7 and 28 day 
forecasts under either condition in paired samples t-tests, t(114) =0.493 and 1.81, p = .623 
and .073, A = .526 and .539  (common language effect size - specifically, the measure of 
stochastic superiority; Vargha & Delaney, 2000), for the direct estimation and MOLE 
conditions respectively. That is, while participants did, in both conditions, increase the width 
of their ranges for the 28 day forecasts relative to the 7, the benefit in terms of calibration was 
zero as the additional width was offset by the parameters’ greater volatility in the longer term. 
The second observation is that the MOLE method produced markedly better 
calibration for both 7 and 28 day forecasts – with approximately 17% more of its ranges 
containing the true value than the direct estimation method.  Paired sample t-tests comparing 
participants’ calibration on the two elicitation methods (for each forecast length separately) 
unambiguously support this, t(114) = 6.92, p <<.001 for the 7 day data and t(114) = 6.06, p 
<< .001 for the 28 day forecasts. The effect size was large in both cases, A = 0.734 and 0.730.  
Turning to Figure 11, one sees a similar pattern of results – although the 28 day result 
for the direct estimation method shows a decline in calibration as a result of the greater 
volatility in the Gold quiz questions discussed above. A paired sample t-test indicated that the 
difference observed here was significant, t(42) = 3.1, p = .004, A = .604. A second, paired 
sample t-test indicated no difference between participant’s 7 and 28 day forecast calibration 
using the MOLE, t(42) = 0.22, p = 0.824, A = 0.521. 
The difference between participants’ mean calibration on the MOLE and direct 
estimation was 17% on the 7 day forecast and 27% at 28 days. Paired sample t-tests 
comparing mean calibration at each forecast length confirmed these differences were 
significant, t(42) = 4.3 and 5.9, p <.001 and p <<.001, A = 0.734 and 0.779. 
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Looking at Figure 11 and the t-test described above, it seems clear there is an 
interaction effect – with the longer period affecting calibration only for participants in the 
direct estimation condition. That is, greater volatility on the Gold quiz questions (discussed 
above) decreased calibration for participants undertaking the direct estimation conditions, but 
not for those answering the same questions using the MOLE. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
The results confirm that the MOLE’s advantaged over direct estimation elicitation 
methods in Experiments 1a, 1b and 2 – extending from perceptual and epistemic paradigms 
to a forecasting approach with greater applicability to real world problems. 
While the MOLE does not eliminate overconfidence (this may, in fact, be impossible 
where error is involved - as discussed by Soll & Klayman, 2004), it reduces it markedly 
compared to direct estimation approaches to elicitation. Overconfidence when using the 
MOLE is around 7% in Experiment 3 – about one third of the direct estimation 
overconfidence of around 25%. 
Some results do, however, require additional explanation; for instance, in the UK 
sample, additional volatility in some parameters across the experiment’s (moving) forecast 
window led to a marked decrease in calibration in the direct estimation task but not the 
MOLE. A likely cause of this is the outside-in method the MOLE uses to construct its final 
range. As shown in Figure 1, this is predicted to result in wider ranges – as observed – but 
also to have a greater effect where uncertainty is higher, as would be expected in the longer 
forecast window. 
By requiring participants to definitively rule values out before removing them from 
consideration (rather than asking whether they should be included), the MOLE preserves as 
much of a person’s ‘region of uncertainty’ as possible. Given the participant (presumably) 
believes any value within this range is possible – all of them should fall within a 100% 
confidence interval and the MOLE makes this far more likely.  
That this makes ranges wider is unsurprising but the fact that it also prevents the drop 
off in calibration seen with unexpectedly high volatility demonstrates the approach’s strength 
and seems to have parallels with Yaniv and Foster’s (1995) accuracy/informativeness trade-
off. That is, people accept values presented by the MOLE as possible, despite the fact that 
they would not report such values themselves for fear of them being deemed uninformative. 
Another interesting observation is that participants maintain the same calibration 
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when predicting further into the future by giving wider ranges,  mirroring the observation that 
expert and novice forecasters have similar levels of overconfidence despite differences in 
knowledge (McKenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008). This suggests people may have a stable, 
preferred levels of calibration or informativeness (an idea supported by findings relating 




As noted above, both the MOLE and direct estimation conditions are assumed to yield 
100% confidence intervals – that is intervals the participant believes will definitely contain 
the true range. While this could, in the direct estimation condition, lead to ‘sandbagging’ (i.e., 
generating 0 to ∞ ranges to guarantee success), this is not observed in the data due to people’s 
tendency towards informativeness (Yaniv & Foster, 1995). (In fact, such wide ranges are not 
generally appropriate. For example, “temperature measured at Heathrow Airport” will not 
ever exceed 400°C - the autoignition point of jet fuel and, thus, the temperature at which the 
airport (and its thermometers) will cease to exist.) 
It should also be noted that a typical calibration task asking for 80% confidence 
intervals can equally easily be ‘gamed’ by providing 80% extremely wide ranges and 20% 
extremely narrow (or just plain wrong) estimates. Any tendency that a person has towards 
such behaviour would, presumably, benefit their calibration scores in the direct estimation 
task to a greater extent than in the MOLE which, as noted above, did not make clear to 
participants the process by which it created a range from their responses. Thus, to the extent 
that such effects impact the data, it would be expected to erode differences between the two 
conditions – which remain marked. Future work could, however, benefit from a consideration 
of proper scoring rules (Brier scores or others; for details see, e.g.,  Carvalho, 2016) which 
penalise such attempts to manipulate calibration. 
The second concern is the requirement that the experimenter set the initial bounds for 
the MOLE – as demonstrated by the authors’ own failure to account for the volatility of the 
silver price for the US sample. While this increases the potential for overconfidence in the 
MOLE results – by causing cases where it is impossible to create a range that contains the 
true value – more judicious use of historical data and natural bounds renders this a relatively 
minor concern. Certainly, defining an initial range is a problem shared with any elicitation 
method that seeks to guide participants to consider a wider range (see, e.g., Haran, Moore, & 
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Morewedge, 2010, who ask participants to assign probabilitites across the full range of 
possible answers - as defined by the experimenters). 
 
6. Discussion 
The results of the four experiments described herein paint a consistent picture, with 
the MOLE process outperforming all of the elicitation methods to which it was compared – 
whether being used to elicit perceptual estimates, epistemic uncertainty or forecasts. This is a 
convincing demonstration of the potential benefits of designing elicitation tools in line with 
what we already know about human cognition and how it affects values elicited from people. 
Key points of interest from the four experiments are as follows. Experiment 1a 
demonstrated that the MOLE, in addition to improving calibration on a task where 
performance was otherwise poor, markedly improved the accuracy of estimates. Examination 
of individual responses also demonstrated that participants’ final best guesses (as calculated 
by the MOLE) were not being anchored by the first options shown to them, providing 
preliminary support for the idea that the MOLE’s presentation of multiple values could erode 
anchoring effects. 
Experiment 1b suggested that this improvement in accuracy could not be explained 
simply by the increased exposure of the stimulus and, instead, that repeated measurement of 
the same parameter explained much of the MOLE’s benefit – although, as was explained at 
the time, how amenable alternative repeated measures methods (like the Interleaved 
elicitation described herein) are to non-perceptual tasks is arguable. Experiment 2 showed 
that the MOLE maintained an advantage over direct estimation elicitation methods when 
changing from a within to between-subjects design and in elicitation tasks involving 
epistemic rather than perceptual uncertainty. It also demonstrated that the benefit of the 
MOLE can not simply be attributed to a benefit provided by the preset, starting ranges 
required by the MOLE. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the MOLE produces better 
forecast ranges than direct estimation of such ranges; and that the MOLE better protected 
against periods of high volatility in the parameter values – presumably as a result of its 
tendency to preserve more of an elicitee’s uncertainty. 
 
6.1 Using the MOLE 
The MOLE process, in its current form, has been shown to be a better method for 
eliciting range estimates from people than any of the direct estimation variants to which we 
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compared it. The MOLE process is, however, also amenable to variation for more specific 
purposes. For instance, the MOLE’s method for determining the range generates a 100% 
confidence interval, whereas some technical uses for elicited values require an 80% 
confidence interval (10th and 90th percentiles, for example). These can, however, be generated 
from the MOLE’s outputs if one makes some basic assumptions. Given that the MOLE 
produces a minimum, maximum and best guess, it is a simple matter to fit a triangular 
distribution to these points and, from this, any desired fractile or percentile can be extracted. 
Should another distribution be desired, these too can be fitted - using a participant’s 
confidence ratings (which contain information about the relative likelihood with which the 
person believes the true value will fall into different regions of the total, feasible range) to 
generate appropriate parameters for a normal or beta distribution – from which the desired 
percentiles can, again, be generated. 
An alternative use, for situations where fitting a distribution might pose difficulties 
(bimodal distributions, for instance), is to use the MOLE to generate the feasible range and 
then use this as the basis for a secondary elicitation process – such as Haran et al’s (2010) 
SPIES procedure, which requires an elicitor to lead an elicitee through a process of assigning 
likelihoods to all possible values of a parameter – essentially building a subjective probability 
density function by hand. The use of the MOLE as a precursor task would limit the elicitation 
to those regions that the participant considered feasible – saving time and effort. 
Another question regards how a person should define the MOLE’s starting range. As 
noted earlier, for questions with natural limits (e.g., percentages), we recommend using those 
as the starting range. In the absence of these, starting with very wide ranges is preferable as 
the MOLE process allows the user to swiftly remove areas that they do not view as feasible 
but has no mechanism for adding range if areas that the user would consider feasible are 
precluded from the starting range. Where databases of prior outcomes exists, these can be 
used as starting points but the MOLE’s starting range should also allow for values lying 
outside the currently observed range. Ideally, of course, the MOLE starting ranges should 
also be set by someone other than the intended user - or at least well in advance - so as to 
prevent their affecting the elicited responses. 
 
6.2 Caveats and Future Research 
6.2.1 Future Research 
Additional work is required to determine whether the current mechanism for reducing 
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the MOLE’s bounds is too conservative or, even, not conservative enough. That is, whether 
people are accidentally removing sections of range that they do not intend to or unable to 
remove sections that they consider unfeasible. The current MOLE process does not have a 
mechanism for examining this but it could be tested experimentally; for example, by 
occasionally providing values from outside the current range as a test that they are, in fact, 
considered infeasible.  
A second line of questioning relates to the optimal number of iterations that the 
MOLE should run for. As noted throughout, the MOLE should generate a 100% confidence 
interval by allowing participants to cut away portions of the range they do not consider 
feasible. Whether the 10 iterations used in our experiments is sufficient for these purposes 
will, of course, be context dependent. Where starting ranges are particularly wide, it may 
require more iterations for a person to finish cutting their range. That said, in our 
experiments, that fact that participants’ ‘evaluated confidence’ in MOLE ranges was less than 
100% indicates that our participants regarded the MOLE as having cut the range sufficiently 
– that is, they were not being left with ranges so wide that they could have been cut further 
while still being regarded as 100% confidence intervals.  
Given that the MOLE procedure is designed to improve accuracy as well as 
calibration – via repeated judgements and the elimination or watering down of 
anchoring/priming effects - altering the number of iterations the MOLE runs for and 
observing the effect this has on best estimates would be another valuable extension.  
This work would seem to lead, naturally, to consideration of the best algorithms for 
selecting values to be presented to participants. Currently, the MOLE selects values randomly 
from a uniform distribution covering the remaining range at any point in the experiment and 
runs for a set number of iterations. A more intelligent algorithm, however, could take into 
account past values or select the most efficient comparisons for testing a participant’s range 
or determining when the process should be terminated. 
Finally, while the MOLE has been designed with the reduction of anchoring effects in 
mind and the preliminary test in Experiment 1a supports this idea, there is a clear need to 
expand on this work with the deliberate introduction of anchoring values and observation of 
how these impact on estimates at various stages of the MOLE process. More generally, there 
is a need to tease apart the impacts of the four underlying assumptions of the MOLE to see 
which of retention of uncertainty, relative judgements, repeated judgement and mitigating 
against anchoring are driving the MOLE’s results.  




6.3 General Conclusions 
The MOLE produces ranges significantly wider than those generated by participants 
required to directly estimate the minimum and maximum points of a range, resulting in 
markedly less overconfidence. This holds true across a range of alternative elicitation 
methods and across three distinct domains – perceptual, epistemic and forecasting tasks. 
Given the common observation that people, in general, are affected by 
overconfidence, the use of elicitation tools such as the MOLE, designed in accordance with 
established psychological theory and relying on cognitive abilities people are comfortable 
using, seems a useful method for improving the accuracy of range estimates.  
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Figure Captions  
 
Figure 1. Pictorial representation of estimating the low-end value of an uncertainty range, 
working from: (a) the best guess; (b) a minimum value. Note that working from best guess 
rather than the minimum value results in a higher low-end estimate and thus a narrower range 
overall due to the width of the person’s region of uncertainty regarding the low-end value. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1a MOLE GUI. 
 
Figure 3. Mean calibration by elicitation method (Exp. 1a). 
 
Figure 4. Scatterplots of estimated and actual number of circles across all participants and 
trials by condition. 
 
Figure 5. Histograms of correlations between individual participant’s estimates and true 
values under each elicitation condition. 
 
Figure 6 Experiment 1b. MOLE GUI. 
 
Figure 7. Scatterplots of true and estimated number of circles in arrays. N = 36 in all cases. 
 
Figure 8 Self-rated confidence in final range and calibration of participants by question type 
and elicitation process. 
 
Figure 9. GUI showing snapshot of MOLE forecasting process. The participant has made 
their selection and is being asked how confident they are that their selected value is closer to 
the true value. 
 
Figure 10. Mean calibration by elicitation condition and forecast window (US sample). 
 
Figure 11. Mean calibration by elicitation condition and forecast window (UK sample). 
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(a)                    Possible Low-End Values   
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(b)                    Possible Low-End Values  
 
  
Figure 1. Pictorial representation of estimating the low-end value of an uncertainty range, 
working from: (a) the best guess; (b) a minimum value. Note that working from best guess 
rather than the minimum value results in a higher low-end estimate and thus a narrower range 
overall due to the width of the person’s region of uncertainty regarding the low-end value. 
 
  




Figure 2. Experiment 1a MOLE GUI 
  








































Figure 4. Scatterplots of estimated and actual number of circles across all participants and 
trials by condition. 
  





Figure 5. Histograms of correlations between individual participant’s estimates and true 
values under each elicitation condition. 
  




Figure 6. Experiment 1b. MOLE GUI. 
  





Figure 7. Scatterplots of true and estimated number of circles in arrays. N = 36 in all cases. 
  





Figure 8. Self-rated confidence in final range and calibration of participants by question type 
and elicitation process.  




Figure 9. GUI showing snapshot of MOLE forecasting process. The participant has made 
their selection and is being asked how confident they are that their selected value is closer to 
the true value. 
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